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ABSTRACT 
 
THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL & A PORTFOLIO OF SMALL 
COMPANIES 
 
By 
 
Gregory C. Eaves 
 
 
Are risky stocks worth it? Do they offer better returns, in exchange for more risk? 
The modern portfolio theory holds that, yes, nondiversifiable risk (systemic risk) 
is rewarded by a higher expected return. 
 
We collected weekly adjusted close ticker prices over seven years—from January 
1999 to January 2006—for 29 US-listed small- or medium-capital companies, 
using the free data from Yahoo! Finance. Yahoo! Finance also provides a beta 
estimate for these companies’ returns compared to the NASDAQ.  
 
With this data set, CAPM-predicted returns can be compared with actual returns. 
It can be tested to see whether or not this portfolio’s returns are to be expected. 
The NASDAQ Composite had a loss over the six years: it started at 2’344.41 in 
January 1999 and ended at 2’205.32 in January 2006. That’s a drop of -0.059, or 
of about -5.9%. 
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We used a portfolio of 29 small-cap stocks as a proxy for the total small-cap 
population. In addition, we used Paulson’s four companies and compared them to 
that larger small-cap population proxy. To get the weights of each stock, we 
looked at how much money Paulson invested in each one. The weights in the 
portfolio represented the amount of money Paulson put into each firm as the 
initial underwriter.  The 10-year US Treasury note was our risk-free asset. 
 
Our portfolio of companies offered above-predicted returns. Therefore, according 
to our data the CAPM does not hold: there are additional returns to be had. This 
may be because of Fischer’s “small firm effect”. This theory holds that smaller 
firms, or those companies with a small market capitalization, outperform larger 
companies. This market anomaly is a factor used to explain superior returns in the 
Three Factor Model created by Gene Fama and Kenneth French: the three factors 
are the market return, companies with high book-to-market values and small stock 
capitalization. In this case, the higher-than-expected returns seen by Paulson 
companies fit with the Three Factor Model.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Long-term wealth is the goal of investing. Sometimes we want money a little 
quicker, but usually we can only make money slowly. Of course, investors want 
investments that bring wealth forever. That seems to be impossible. But some 
firms are more likely to bring wealth to their owners than others, at least for a 
short time. These are the “risky assets” in an investor’s portfolio. They are “risky” 
because their returns are not guaranteed and can seem to be unpredictable. US 
government debt is considered to be “risk-free”, since Washington, DC, has yet to 
default on a loan. 
 
If we invest in a company—that is, if we become partial owners—how do we 
know if the market reflects its value. Are markets efficient? Specifically, are 
markets for risky assets efficient? What is a share worth? How much should I pay 
to own part of this firm? These are questions that run through the mind of every 
investor. 
 
Paulson Investment Company is one such investor. It is a small-capital investment 
bank, similar to others. It specializes in high-risk, high-tech firms. It generally 
takes about six or seven companies public per year. It researches many more firms 
than it ends up not taking public. Paulson Investment works with firms that seek 
initial capital of normally less than USD 40 million.  
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Paulson, along with J.M. Dutton & Associates, sponsors a yearly conference in 
New York: the Westergaard SmallCap Conference. Year 2005 was the 28th 
Westergaard Conference. Thirty-one companies gave presentations, to seek 
finance. Paulson was the main underwriter for five of them. Institutional 
investors—fund managers, investment advisors, registered representatives, etc.—
attend the Westergaard Conference to see presentations by these smaller firms. 
They look for investments that will offer above-market returns. 
 
These firms are mostly traded on the NASDAQ exchange, a few in OTC markets. 
Their betas are calculated with regard to the NASDAQ Composite. Are these 
small firms worth the risk involved in investing in them? 
 8
 
BODY OF THESIS 
 
Theoretical Review 
 
Market prices offer the best way to determine the value of a firm or of a firm’s 
assets, or property. This is important not only to those buying and selling 
businesses but also to regulators. An insurer, for example, may appear strong if it 
values the securities it owns at the prices it paid for them years ago, but the 
relevant question for judging its solvency is what prices those securities could be 
sold for if it needed cash to pay claims today.  
 
In 1935, John Maynard Keynes is quoted as saying, “It is usually agreed that 
casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps 
the same is true of Stock Exchanges.”1 Some people may use stock markets as 
roulette wheels. But for all their shortcomings, stock markets remain the best way 
to bring people with money to invest together with people who can put that 
investment to productive use.  
 
The shares of highly capitalized firms are traded frequently. Their prices often 
move from minute to minute. The path these movements follow is known to 
economists as a “random walk”. This means that current or past share prices are 
                                                 
1 http://www.tomments.com/ 
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of no help in predicting future prices. The fact a share’s price has risen (or fallen) 
does not mean that its next movement is likely to be up (or down). 
 
Many price changes have no identifiable cause. They simply reflect the desires of 
two investors at a particular moment. But there are also price changes that can be 
attributed to the arrival of new information in the market. For example, a press 
release announcing that an aircraft manufacturer won a big order will boost its 
shares. But the higher price may not last as investors examine the customer’s 
finances and conclude that it may not be able to afford the planes. The efficient 
market hypothesis contends that investors cannot make money trading on news 
reports and other public information, because the information is reflected in share 
prices as soon as it is known. 
 
A stronger form of the efficient market hypothesis holds that share prices already 
incorporate all relevant information, whether public or non-public. If this were 
true, there would be no value in studying a company or an industry before 
deciding whether to buy shares. The evidence for this assertion, however, is weak. 
Although markets do act quickly on information, there are many anomalies, 
situations in which an astute investor is able to profit from identifying factors that 
are not yet reflected in a share’s price.  
 
William Shape published the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in 1964. 
Parallel work was also performed by Treynor (in 1961) and Lintner (1965). The 
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CAPM extended Harry Markowitz’s portfolio theory to introduce the notions of 
systematic and specific risk. For his work on the CAPM, Sharpe shared the 1990 
Nobel Prize in Economics with Harry Markowitz and Merton Miller.  
 
The CAPM decomposes a portfolio’s risk into systematic and specific risk. 
Systematic risk is the risk of holding the market portfolio. As the market moves, 
each individual asset is more or less affected. To the extent that any asset 
participates in such general market moves, that asset entails systematic risk. 
Specific risk is the risk which is unique to an individual asset. It represents the 
component of an asset’s return which is uncorrelated with general market moves.  
 
According to the CAPM, the marketplace compensates investors for taking 
systematic risk but not for taking specific risk. This is because specific risk can be 
diversified away. When an investor holds the market portfolio, each individual 
asset in that portfolio entails specific risk, but through diversification, the 
investor’s net exposure is just the systematic risk of the market portfolio.  
 
Systematic risk can be measured using beta. According to the CAPM, the 
expected return of a stock equals the risk-free rate plus the portfolio’s beta 
multiplied by the expected excess return of the market portfolio. Stated another 
way, the stock’s excess expected return over the risk-free rate equals its beta times 
the market’s expected excess return over the risk free rate.  
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This relationship is the essential conclusion of the CAPM. It states that a stock’s 
(or portfolio’s) excess expected return depends on its beta and not on its volatility. 
Stated another way, excess return depends upon systematic risk and not on total 
risk. 
 
We call the CAPM a “capital asset pricing model” because, given a beta and an 
expected return for an asset, investors will bid its current price up or down, 
adjusting that expected return so that it satisfies the formula. Accordingly, the 
CAPM predicts the equilibrium price of an asset. This works because the model 
assumes that all investors agree on the beta and expected return of any asset. In 
practice, this assumption is unreasonable, so the CAPM is largely of theoretical 
value. It is the most famous example of an equilibrium pricing model.  
 
Beta is a measure of a share’s price volatility, relative to the average volatility of 
the national stock market. A share with a beta of 1.0 will, on average, move in 
tandem with the market average; a share with a beta of 1.5 can be expected to rise 
(or fall) 1.5% when the market rises (or falls) 1%. A share with a negative beta 
moves, on average, in the opposite direction from the market.  
 
A high positive beta signifies a risky share that can be expected to outperform the 
market in good times but fall more than the market in bad times. The shares of 
many small firms, so-called small-cap stocks, carry high betas. A stock with a 
positive beta of less than 1.0 is a conservative investment; it is safer in a falling 
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market, but offers less potential for appreciation when the market is rising. Shares 
with negative beta are for contrarians who want stocks that are likely to rise as the 
market falls. The betas of widely traded shares can be found in many investment 
periodicals and in research reports issued by stockbrokerage firms.  
 
Pricing an initial public offering (I.P.O.) can be difficult. For example, in April 
2006 Paulson brought public American Mould Guard (NASDAQ:AMGIU). The 
company’s shares started trading at USD 13.50.  How do companies determine 
this price? 
 
Many people, in particular Fama and French in 19962, have examined the 
difficulties in pricing I.P.O.s. Generally, it seems as if I.P.O.s outperform in the 
short run, but underperform in the longer run. Part of the difficulty in pricing 
I.P.O.s is the information asymmetry. Venture capital firms, like Paulson, 
specialize in collecting and evaluating information on start-up, or “growth”, firms. 
Alon Brav and Paul Gompers have done a study3 that looked at whether there are 
longer-term effects associated with the presence of venture capitalists when a 
company goes public. In favour of venture capitalists/ underwriters, the authors 
say that venture capitalists: stay on the board of directors long after the I.P.O.; 
enforce management structures that help the firm in the long run; affect who 
                                                 
2 Eugene Fama  and Kennth French, “Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies,” 
Journal of Finance, 1996. 
3 Alon Brav and Paul Gompers, “Myth Or Reality? The Long -Run Underperformance of Initial 
Public Offerings: Evidence for Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies”, Journal of 
Finance December 1997. 
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hold’s a company’s shares; and improve the “reputation”, or “credibility”, of the 
new company.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the successful returns seen by Paulson-invested 
companies is in line with Fama & French’s Three Factor Model. This model holds 
that smaller companies have greater growth opportunities than larger companies. 
These smaller firms also have more volatile business environments; they may be 
in high-tech or in other emerging industries. By correcting these problems, i.e., 
receiving a large amount of new capital, these companies can see a large, short-
term appreciation: their stock price will go up more than expected if they get a 
large amount of new capital.  
 
As mentioned above, Paulson recently brought another company public with a 
stock price of USD 13.50. This low price normal for small-capital companies. 
They tend to have lower stock prices. Lower stock prices allow for more potential 
for upward movement, and higher percentage rates of growth if the company does 
well.  
 
The CAPM 
 
The CAPM lets us test whether or not a company’s risk is rewarded by more 
successful returns. There a few assumptions required to test the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM). Any finance textbook would list them in its first heading 
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under “CAPM”. These assumptions create an ideal world. This is good for testing 
economic theories, less good for real-world investing. 
 
The usefulness of the CAPM is still not decided. Some studies support the 
CAPM: Black; Black, Jensen & Scholes; and Fama & MacBeth. Some studies 
challenge the CAPM: Banz; and Fama & French. Then, some studies even 
challenge those challenges: Amihud, Christensen & Mendelson; Black; Breen & 
Korajczyk; Jagannatham & Wang; Kothari, Shanken & Sloan. Even though the 
academic debate continues, we believe the CAPM may still be useful for long-
term value investors. 
 
To derive the CAPM, we start by choosing an arbitrary portfolio of assets. We let 
Rf be the return on the risk-free asset. By investing USD 1, the investor will be 
guaranteed a return of $Rf. Beyond the risk-free asset, we use a formula to 
calculate the expected returns. Kc is the risk-adjusted discount rate (also known as 
the Cost of Capital). Km is the return rate of a market benchmark, such as the 
NASDAQ Composite.  
 
If we’re using a sample portfolio, the CAPM theory works out to this: 
][ FMFC RKRK −+= β  
The Kc is the estimated return of our sample portfolio. Using the weights of 
Paulson investments in each firm, we will use Paulson-invested companies as our 
sample portfolio. Paulson only invested in four of the 29 companies.  
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For an individual asset, the CAPM uses slightly different notation: 
)( fmafa rrrr −+= β  
The ra is the expected return for a given asset, in our case a stock price. The βa is 
the individual stock’s beta compared to its market, normally the NASDAQ.  
 
The two formulas are slightly different, one for a portfolio and one for an asset. 
The common element in both equations is the risk free rate. For us, that’s a 10-
year US Treasury bond. The two formulas explain a similar relation between 
assets or portfolios and a larger market. We can turn this formula around in our 
heads to understand what it means for investors: they need to be compensated for 
both the time value of their money and for the risk they take on. 
 
The time value of money shows up with the risk-free rate ( fr ). This is what the 
investor could get otherwise if he put his money in a 10-year US Treasury bond. 
 
The other half of the formula ( )( fma rr −β ) shows risk. It calculates the amount 
of compensation the investor needs to take on for any risk above and beyond that 
of the general market. It’s a variation of a discounted cash flow. According to our 
data, 10-year US Treasury are offering rates of 4.95% but the NASDAQ only 
grew by 0%4. 
 
                                                 
4 As found at Yahoo! Finance: http://finance.yahoo.com/bonds 
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Each company has a different beta, as calculated by Capital IQ, a company that 
supplies Yahoo! Finance with financial data. The security market line (SML) 
must show the risk premium for each stock. It’s a relation between a company’s 
beta and the expected return. (Please see Table 6, on page 24.) 
 
To test the CAPM and the portfolio of small-cap firms, we will look at our 
portfolio of 29 Westergaard companies. In this portfolio, each company is given 
an equal weight. This portfolio of Westergaard companies can be thought of as an 
index of small-cap companies to be compared to the larger NASDAQ. The 
average beta for all 29 firms  was 2.072. (Please see Appendix 2, page 37.) 
][ FMFC RKRK −+= β  
]95.406.0[95.4 −−+= βCK  
431.5−=  
 
The top five actual change in stock prices between January 1999 and January 
2006 were seen by the following firms: TASR (1’251.84%, from $0.53 to $6.96), 
BIPH.OB (375.00%), DSTI (289.58%), INMD (243.90%) and ISR (206.63%).  
 
The Portfolio 
 
Individual investors have control over only one aspect of their investment 
performance: the allocation of assets among broad asset categories. Nobody 
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controls the stock market, and no one has direct control over the value of their 
shares or bonds. Small-cap stocks are only one type of asset category.  
 
An investor must first make the capital allocation decision. This is the balance 
between risk-free assets (such as bonds, which are, theoretically, risk-free) and 
risky assets (such as our stocks). Riskiness is more interesting, particularly from a 
researcher’s point of view; the dream of wealth is large. 
 
Most investors will have at least some of their money in risky assets. Normally, 
these risky assets are publicly traded shares. This is for investors who already 
have a comfortable amount of savings in risk-free/ safe assets. This portfolio is for 
those investors with a certain degree of risk tolerance. The portfolio made in step 
one is a possible proxy for all small-cap firms in the US, compared to the 
NASDAQ. Our expected return is -5.431. Why is this so? 
 
If we buy only one stock, we are exposed to that one company’s firm-specific risk. 
This is diversifiable, however. So we design a portfolio of risky assets. However, 
this total risk is only diversifiable to a point. We cannot diversify away all the 
systemic risk. 
 
Similarly, if we buy only one stock, we are exposed to that one firm’s reaction, or 
response, to the market. If an estimated market goes up or down, the company’s 
share price will generally go up or down as well. This is called systemic risk, 
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measured by “beta”. We can also design our portfolio of risky assets to take into 
account each firm’s different reaction to the market. With one security, we are 
exposed to both undiversifiable systemic risk and diversifiable or firm-specific 
risk. However, by constructing a portfolio with multiple securities, we can reduce 
the total risk by diversifying away the non-systemic risk. Our theoretical portfolio 
of risky assets was made up of four companies that Paulson brought public or 
helped to bring public in 2005. 
 
Once we have a portfolio—even an optimal portfolio—how do we know if it did 
any better than the market as a whole, or than any other portfolio? To determine 
that, in the final part of this thesis, we test whether these stocks actually 
performed better than either the S&P 500 index or the NASDAQ Composite 
index. Our portfolio produced a CAL inferior to the CML. This larger portfolio of 
small-cap, risky stocks was unsuccessful—if it were a portfolio—compared to the 
NASDAQ. 
 
With the total stock price change from January 1999 to January 2006 for each of 
the 29 firms that presented at the Westergaard Conference, we can compute the 
mean return and use this sample mean to estimate the mean return over time to 
each firm. In other words, we can estimate a population parameter from our single 
sample. 
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We are trying to show whether the 29 stocks have generated returns 
commensurate with their systemic risk (beta). Though Paulson itself only directly 
financed 5 of these firms, we are using the larger portfolio of 29 stocks which 
Paulson worked with at the recent Westergaard small-cap conference.  
 
Our population is all small- or mid-cap stocks listed in the US, particularly small-
cap risky firms in emerging technologies. Our parameter—that which matters to 
investments—is the value of the share price.  
 
A confidence interval is a range of values within which we expect the population 
parameter to occur. Our portfolio was tested at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 
levels. 
 
In terms of investment advisory services, this is what some research analysts do 
for their clients: design portfolios. Asset managers use CAPM, betas and market 
to tailor portfolios to their clients’ needs and risk-tolerance levels. After the 
hypothesis test, the final step in this process, an investment advisor would not be 
able to say, “I’m 90% certain that a mixed portfolio of these 29 companies would 
have given you a return of 0.17% between 1999 and 2006.”  
 
US finance industry regulation is quite strong. As an investment advisor I’m 
legally allowed to make the above statement only if, basically, I did the research 
myself. The math and number-crunching is proprietary and the investment advisor 
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must tailor each statement to each client’s needs, tolerance for risk and net worth. 
The two large self-regulatory organizations (SROs) in the US, the NASD and the 
SEC, are quite strict. 
 
Equities can offer better returns than more staid investments, like US Treasury 
bonds. The NASDAQ Composite during our time period went down by about five 
percent. However, the share prices of many of our individual firms saw high 
growth, as reflected in Yahoo! Finance. Prices were adjusted the stock prices for 
dividends or splits.  
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is our most common asset-pricing 
model: it tells us what our investments are worth. Construction firms use it for 
project management and valuation; investment advisors use it to value their 
portfolios. It’s just a way to value things. It determines a “hurdle rate”, the 
required rate of return for a project, through a discounted cash flow analysis. An 
investment makes sense—and money—above this rate. For our clients, the 
required rate of return is often the market’s rate of return; any lower, and the stock 
broker is fired. 
 
So our CAPM gives us a theoretical relationship between the risk of our portfolio 
and its expected return. It helps answer the question, “Is this worth it?” This gives 
us a benchmark target, allowing us to value as-yet undeveloped resources (i.e., 
portfolios we’re going to design in the future). 
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We need to know how and why it fails. If the CAPM fails, it does not necessarily 
mean that the market is efficient, according to Rolls5. The CAPM may appear to 
be rejected, not because it is wrong, but because the NASDAQ Composite—or 
whatever one uses as a “market”—is not close enough to the true market portfolio 
available to investors. For example, investors can always put their money in gold 
or real estate, two factors not accounted for in our CAPM “market”. The 
NASDAQ, or any index, is only a sample of the greater market.  
 
The expected return of a project with a beta ( β ) of zero is simply the risk free 
rate ( FR ). Six of our companies had a beta between -0.5 and +0.5. The expected 
return of a project with a beta (β ) of 1 is the same as the expected return on the 
market (Km). Only two of our companies had a beta between +0.5 and +1.5. 
 
                                                 
5 Roll, Richard. . "A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests: Part I: On Past and Potential 
Testability of the Theory." Journal of Financial Economics. 4 (March 1977): 129-76. 
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Table 1—Beta versus Absolute stock price change 
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The Hypothesis Test 
 
Paulson had a theoretical portfolio of USD 71.125 million, as per Table 4. Of 
Paulson companies that presented at the Westergaard Conference, only four of 
them can constitute a theoretical Paulson investment portfolio. In all three cases, 
the actual returns were higher than the CAPM-predicted returns.  
 
 
 
 23
Table 2—Paulson Theoretical Portfolio 
Company IPO investment (USD, million) Betas 
Difference (between 
actual returns and 
CAPM-predicted 
returns) 
ICOP 10.725 4.21 -39.67 
I-Sector 8.3 1.65 209.95 
Lumera 41.7 3.05 -24.63 
Taser 10.4 8.70 1251.84 
 
Paulson’s total investment in these four firms was USD 71.125 million. This was 
Paulson’s portfolio of underwritings, though the firm held other assets in addition 
to these.  
 
The population of the stock market is too large to feasibly study every single 
potential company in a total population. There are too many publicly listed 
companies in the world. The results would not be worth the effort to gather data 
on every company in the world, every company in the US, every small-cap 
company in the US or even every small-cap risky company listed in the US6. 
 
Reuters has a few built in company lists at its finance news site. There is a “US 
Companies—All Small Cap” pre-fabricated list. Reuters shows 779 companies in 
this list. That is a large number of companies.  
 
                                                 
6 Reuters Finance, for example, has a feature at its homepage called the “PowerScreener”. From 
the Reuters Investing homepage (http://today.reuters.com/news/home.aspx), we can click on 
“Ideas & Screening” in the left margin. This brings us to the “Ideas & Screening” page 
(http://www.investor.reuters.com/ArticleEntry.aspx?target=%2fopinion).  
Again along the left, click on “PowerScreener Lite”. This is Reuters’ free version of its 
PowerScreener. You need to create a free username/ password combination to use this feature.  
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An alternative to compiling and researching each of Reuters’ 779 small-cap 
companies is to use a sample. To narrow this, we simply chose firms that were 
involved with Paulson Investment when they went public.  
 
We need to keep in mind that our sample may be biased. Perhaps Paulson only 
selects particularly successful companies to work with, or particularly bad 
companies. Paulson is one of the few, independent underwriters. It was founded 
in the early 1970s and has a record of successful underwritings. So perhaps a list 
of companies underwritten by Paulson would show a bias toward successful firms.  
 
We can test a statement to determine whether the sample does or does not support 
the statement that small-capital stocks offer a better return than the S&P average. 
 
The portfolio beta is the weight of IPO investment Paulson invested into each 
firm. ICOP had 15.08% of this total portfolio, I-Sector 11.67%, Lumera 58.63% 
and Taser 14.62%. The beta for this portfolio would be 3.89. 
 
Our first step is to state the null and alternate hypotheses. We believe Paulson’s 
small portfolio of 4 underwritings will outperform either the NASDAQ 
Composite index. 
 
NSDQPAUL retExpretExpH ....:0 ≤  
NSDQPAUL retExpretExpH ....:1 >  
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For our test statistic, we cannot use z. The standard normal distribution can only 
be used if our population is known to follow a normal distribution and if we know 
the real, complete standard deviation for the whole population. As mentioned 
above, there are too many listed companies in the world to get “real” population 
data. Second, we have much fewer than 30 samples. Finally, we don’t know our 
standard deviation. So we replace the standard normal distribution with what’s 
called a t distribution. It’s a little flatter and more spread out (wider) than the z 
distribution. As our sample increases—that is, as our degrees of freedom 
increase—the t distribution begins to look more and more like the z distribution.  
 
The t formula is below. 
n
s
Xt µ−=  
 
The µ  is our hypothesized population mean. This was the mean for the 
hypothesized population of 29 companies. The average return for those 
companies was 16.98%. The n  is the number of observations in our sample, 4. To 
get our critical value, our degrees of freedom would be 3, or 1−n . 
 
The mean of our sample is X . For us, this is the mean return for our four 
Paulson-invested companies, 2’563.72%. Please see below. For example, I-Cop’s 
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stock price between January 1999 and January 2006 went from $15.5 to $6.85, a 
drop of 55.81%. The other numbers are below. 
 
Table 3—Paulson Theoretical Portfolio stock price change 
Company Stock price in Jan. 1999 Stock price in Jan. 2006 % ∆ 
ICOP 15.5 6.85 -55.806 
I-Sector 1.81 5.55 +206.630 
Lumera 0.53 6.96 +2’477.850 
Taser 5.75 3.74 -64.957 
 
 
The s  is the standard deviation of our sample. The standard deviation of our 
portfolio, weighted by the amount of money Paulson put into each company, was 
112.92%. Please see the calculations and table below. 
 
 
4
)477.10*62.14()562.2*63.58()632.11*67.11()832.0*075.15( +++
=  
4
17374.15321006.15074544.13554240.12 +++
=  
4
67164.451
=  
91791.112=  
 
Table 4—Paulson Theoretical Portfolio standard deviation of stock price 
Company Average weekly change % Standard deviation % 
ICOP 0.588% 0.832% 
I-Sector -2.707% 11.632% 
Lumera 2.681% 2.562% 
Taser 1.956% 10.477% 
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For our hypothesis test, we will have two levels of significance: 95% and 99%. 
The 0.05 (or 95%) level is used for consumer research projects. The 0.01 (99%) 
level for quality assurance. The more lax 0.10 (90%) level is used for political 
polling. We want to make sure our portfolio will, actually, out-perform the market, 
so we will stick with 95% and 99%. 
 
The decision rule states the conditions under which 0H  is rejected. This requires 
calculating the critical value. It’s simply a number that acts as a dividing point 
between two areas under the curve. A decision is made whether to reject or not 
reject the null hypothesis based on this critical value.  
 
Our p-value expresses the likelihood that our 0H  is not true. It’s the chances of 
seeing a sample value as extreme as, or more extreme than, that which we 
observed, given that the null hypothesis is true. 
 
The critical values of t are given in any t distribution chart. A portion of the t 
distribution chart is below. 
 
Table 5—Critical Values for Hypothesis Test 
Confidence Intervals 
90% 95% 98.5% 99% 
Level of Significance for One-Tailed Test df 
0.01 0.05 0.020 0.01 
3 1.638 2.353 3.182 4.54070 
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Our test is one-tailed. We are testing to see whether our optimal risky portfolio 
has greater returns than the market. We are not testing whether our optimal risky 
portfolio merely has a result different from the market.  
 
For our 99% confidence level and our 3 degrees of freedom, the value is 4.541. 
Because this is a one-tailed test and the rejection region is to the left of our 
distribution, the critical value must be negative. The decision rule is to reject 0H  
if the value of t is less than that. 
 
To see if our optimal, restricted (no short sales or margin accounts) risky portfolio 
return is likely to happen, we use the following data: %72.563'2=X , the sample 
mean; %98.16=µ , the hypothesized population mean; %92.112=s , the sample 
standard deviation; and 4=n , the number of observations. 
 
The value of t is quite large, at -20.40. It is found by the formula below: 
11.45
46.56
74.546'2
2
92.112
74.546'2
4
92.112
98.1672.563'2
===
−
=
−
=
n
s
Xt µ  
 
Because 45.11 lies in the region to the right of the critical value, the null 
hypothesis is accepted at either significance level. There is no statistically 
significant difference between X  and µ . This indicates that Paulson’s portfolio 
will not necessarily give better results than the greater population sample of 
Westergaard companies.  
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Data used. 
 
There were 30 companies that presented at the Westergaard conference in 2005. 
One of these, Chinamerica Fund, is a portfolio of three other companies, making 
the company total 32. Three had no publicly available stock price data at Yahoo! 
Finance. Those three are marked with an asterisk in the table below. Our total 
number of company data lists, then, is 29. 
 
Paulson was the main underwriter for five of these: ICOP, I-Sector, Lumera, 
NuVim and Taser. Below is a list of the investment Paulson made in each of the 
five. 
 
Table 6—Recent Paulson Investments 
Company Initial investment (USD, million) 
ICOP 10.725 
I-Sector 8.3 
Lumera 41.7 
NuVim 2.7 
Taser 10.4 
 
 
Not all the companies at the Westergaard Conference have complete stock price 
history from January 1999 until January 2006. BAK Li-Ion Battery (over the 
counter bulletin board (OTCBB) ticker symbol: CBBT), for example, has barely 
one year of stock price data. Only eight of the companies have complete data for 
all seven years (all of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). 
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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Based on the above, we should feel wary of small, risky companies. The portfolio 
of Paulson companies showed greater-than-market returns. But, as per the 
hypothesis test, this may not be true every time. Our results were based on past 
data and similar returns may not happen in the future. Data from Fama and French 
show that small-cap value stocks have outperformed the broader market by more 
than five percentage points since 19277. It seems our data fits with their results. 
But, we still failed the hypothesis test: are results may be an anomaly.  
 
As we said in the introduction, wealth for the long-haul is the goal for most 
investors; getting rich slowly is the surest way to do so. But some firms are more 
likely to bring wealth than others, at least for a short time. These are the “risky 
assets” in any investor’s portfolio. Our portfolio of Paulson-invested companies 
has been shown to bring wealth, at least for the seven years from 1999-2006. Our 
sample population, of Westergaard companies, grew, too. We cannot reject the 
null, even though our portfolio’s and population’s expected returns are greater 
than the market’s.  
 
There are a few actions we could take to make our research more thorough. 
                                                 
7 Fama and French, 1992, The cross-section of expected stock returns, Journal of Finance 47, 427-
465. 
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• We could follow our 29 stocks throughout 2005 and into 2006. More data 
would allow us to see whether or not any one stock’s returns were 
abnormal. 
• Paulson Investment Company has also recently found two more firms 
which could be used as parts of its investment portfolio. These could be 
added, using data as far back as January 1999. 
• Our sample size of 4 is very small. A better hypothesis test could be done 
if we looked at all Paulson-underwritten companies since the company 
opened, in 1971. This larger group, compared to Reuter’s list of small-cap 
companies, for example, would give us a stronger answer to our 
hypothesis test. 
• Our data during this time frame is unique. Our risk-free asset gave better 
returns than the market: ten-year US Treasury notes currently have a 
4.95% yield; both the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ saw only 0% growth 
over the past seven years.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Twenty-nine small- and mid-cap promising investment opportunities 
 
Company Market: Ticker Homepage 
Ampex Corp. Nasdaq: AMPX www.ampex.com 
AVI BioPharma Inc. Nasdaq: AVII www.avibio.com 
Biophan Technologies, Inc. OTCBB: BIPH.OB www.biophan.com 
Cadence Resources Corp. OTCBB: CDNR.OB TBA 
Charles & Colvard Ltd. Nasdaq: CTHR www.moissanite.com 
Chemokine Therapeutics 
Corp. 
OTCBB: CHKT.OB* www.chemokine.net 
Chinamerica Fund, LP   www.chinamericafund.com 
China Digital Wireless OTCBB: CHDW.OB   
BAK Li-Ion Battery OTCBB: CBBT.OB   
China Agritech, Inc. OTCBB: CAGC.OB*   
DayStar Technologies, Inc. Nasdaq: DSTI www.daystartech.com 
DXP Enterprises Inc. Nasdaq: DXPE www.dxpe.com 
Elron Electronic Industries 
Ltd. 
Nasdaq: ELRN www.elron.com 
GigaBeam Corp. OTCBB: GGBM.OB www.gigabeam.com 
HyperSpace 
Communications Inc. 
AMEX: HCO www.ehyperspace.com 
ICOP Digital Inc. Nasdaq: ICOP www.icopdigital.com 
IntegraMed America Inc. Nasdaq: INMD www.integramed.com 
Internet Gold Golden Lines 
Ltd. 
Nasdaq: IGLD www.igld.com 
I-Sector Corp. AMEX: ISR www.i-sector.com 
Joystar Inc. OTCBB: JYSR.OB www.joystar.com 
Lantronix, Inc. Nasdaq: LTRX www.lantronix.com 
LJ International Inc. Nasdaq: JADE www.ljintl.com 
Lumera Corp. Nasdaq: LMRA www.lumera.com 
Memry Corp. AMEX: MRY www.memry.com 
NuVim Inc. OTCBB: NUVM.OB* www.nuvim.com 
Pacific Ethanol, Inc. Nasdaq: PEIX www.pacificethanol.net 
Synergetics USA, Inc. Nasdaq: SURG www.synergeticsusa.com 
TASER International Inc. Nasdaq: TASR www.taser.com 
Telkonet, Inc. AMEX: TKO www.telkonet.com 
Vita Cube Systems 
Holdings, Inc./ XELR8 
Holdings, Inc. 
AMEX: PRH www.xelr8.com 
Vyteris Holdings Inc. OTCBB: VYHN.OB www.vyteris.com 
Wave Systems Corp. Nasdaq: WAVX www.wave.com 
XAAR Plc. LSE: XAR www.xaar.co.uk 
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Appendix 2 
 
CAPM Test For Individual Companies 
 
Risk-
free 
rate of 
interest
Expected 
return of 
the 
market Company 
Market: 
Ticker Beta 
4.95 -0.06 
Expected 
return 
(by 
CAPM) 
Average 
standard 
deviation 
(%) 
Actual 
change, 
from Jan. 
1999 to 
Jan. 
2006(%) 
Difference 
(between 
actual 
return 
and 
expected 
return) 
Ampex Corp. Nasdaq: AMPX 4.22 4.95 -0.06 -16.19 11.83 -45.63% -29.44 
AVI BioPharma 
Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
AVII 2.55 4.95 -0.06 -7.82 -1.94 -12.44% -4.61 
Biophan 
Technologies, 
Inc. 
OTCBB: 
BIPH.OB 0.87 4.95 -0.06 0.59 15.08 375.00% 374.41 
Cadence 
Resources 
Corp. 
OTCBB: 
CDNR.OB 0.31 4.95 -0.06 3.40 8.58 100.88% 97.49 
Charles & 
Colvard Ltd. 
Nasdaq: 
CTHR 0.00 4.95 -0.06 4.95 7.18 44.54% 39.59 
Chemokine 
Therapeutics 
Corp. 
OTCBB: 
CHKT.OB* n/a 4.95 -0.06 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Chinamerica 
Fund, LP   n/a 4.95 -0.06 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
China Digital 
Wireless 
OTCBB: 
CHDW.OB n/a 4.95 -0.06 n/a 20.93 -61.45% n/a 
BAK Li-Ion 
Battery 
OTCBB: 
CBBT.OB n/a 4.95 -0.06 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
China Agritech, 
Inc. 
OTCBB: 
CAGC.OB* n/a 4.95 -0.06 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
DayStar 
Technologies, 
Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
DSTI 1.88 4.95 -0.06 -4.47 14.83 289.58% 294.05 
DXP Enterprises 
Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
DXPE 3.50 4.95 -0.06 -12.58 9.68 105.25% 117.83 
Elron Electronic 
Industries Ltd. 
Nasdaq: 
ELRN 1.60 4.95 -0.06 -3.06 4.19 -12.79% -9.72 
GigaBeam Corp. NasdaqSC: GGBM 5.38 4.95 -0.06 -22.00 4.04 78.82% 100.82 
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HyperSpace 
Communications 
Inc. 
AMEX: 
HCO 
-
2.98 4.95 -0.06 19.88 10.04 94.72% 74.84 
ICOP Digital Inc. Nasdaq: ICOP 4.21 4.95 -0.06 -16.14 0.83 -55.81% -39.67 
IntegraMed 
America Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
INMD 
-
0.48 4.95 -0.06 7.35 11.09 243.90% 236.54 
Internet Gold 
Golden Lines 
Ltd. 
Nasdaq: 
IGLD 2.50 4.95 -0.06 -7.57 8.82 -26.18% -18.61 
I-Sector Corp. AMEX: ISR 1.65 4.95 -0.06 -3.32 11.63 206.63% 209.95 
Joystar Inc. OTCBB: JYSR.OB 1.66 4.95 -0.06 -3.37 6.94 94.12% 97.48 
Lantronix, Inc. Nasdaq: LTRX 0.44 4.95 -0.06 2.75 14.09 -79.38% -82.12 
LJ International 
Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
JADE 1.93 4.95 -0.06 -4.72 8.36 115.72% 120.44 
Lumera Corp. Nasdaq: LMRA 3.05 4.95 -0.06 -10.33 2.56 -34.96% -24.63 
Memry Corp. AMEX: MRY 1.09 4.95 -0.06 -0.51 8.07 -32.03% -31.52 
NuVim Inc. OTCBB: NUVM.OB* 0.00 4.95 -0.06 4.95     -4.95 
Pacific Ethanol, 
Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
PEIX 6.17 4.95 -0.06 -25.96   3.54% 29.50 
Synergetics 
USA, Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
SURG 1.60 4.95 -0.06 -3.06   -21.22% -18.15 
TASER 
International Inc. 
Nasdaq: 
TASR 8.70 4.95 -0.06 -38.63 10.48 1213.21% 1251.84 
Telkonet, Inc. AMEX: TKO 2.36 4.95 -0.06 -6.87 3.34 123.12% 129.99 
Vita Cube 
Systems 
Holdings, Inc./ 
XELR8 Holdings 
AMEX: 
PRH 1.22 4.95 -0.06 -1.16 3.65 -90.78% -89.62 
Vyteris Holdings 
Inc. 
OTCBB: 
VYHN.OB 0.00 4.95 -0.06 4.95   -28.13% -33.08 
Wave Systems 
Corp. 
Nasdaq: 
WAVX 2.51 4.95 -0.06 -7.62 9.77 -97.16% -89.54 
XAAR Plc. LSE: XAR n/a 4.95 -0.06 n/a 7.63 219.07% n/a 
n/a = data not available        
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Appendix 3 
 
Data Analysis—Regression 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT               
           
Regression Statistics         
Multiple R 0.42        
R Square 0.18        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.14        
Standard 
Error 2.35        
Observations 27.00        
           
ANOVA          
  df SS MS F Significance F     
Regression 1.00 29.21 29.21 5.31 0.03    
Residual 25.00 137.57 5.50      
Total 26.00 166.79          
           
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -0.01 0.61 -0.01 0.99 -1.26 1.25 -1.26 1.25 
X Variable 1 0.45 0.20 2.30 0.03 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.86 
           
           
           
RESIDUAL 
OUTPUT     
PROBABILITY 
OUTPUT     
           
Observation Predicted Y Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals  Percentile Y    
AMPX 1.91 -2.36 -1.03 1.85 -0.97   
AVII 1.15 -1.28 -0.55 5.56 -0.91   
BIPH 0.39 3.36 1.46 9.26 -0.79   
CDNR 0.13 0.87 0.38 12.96 -0.56   
CTHR -0.01 0.45 0.20 16.67 -0.46   
DSTI 0.85 2.05 0.89 20.37 -0.35   
DXPE 1.58 -0.53 -0.23 24.07 -0.32   
ELRN 0.72 -0.85 -0.37 27.78 -0.28   
GGBM 2.43 -1.65 -0.72 31.48 -0.26   
HCO -1.36 2.30 1.00 35.19 -0.21   
ICOP 1.90 -2.46 -1.07 38.89 -0.13   
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IGLD 1.13 -1.39 -0.60 42.59 -0.12   
INMD -0.22 2.66 1.16 46.30 -0.06   
ISR 0.74 1.32 0.58 50.00 0.04   
JADE 0.87 0.29 0.13 53.70 0.45   
JYSR 0.75 0.19 0.08 57.41 0.79   
LMRA 1.38 -1.73 -0.75 61.11 0.94   
LTRX 0.19 -0.99 -0.43 64.81 0.95   
MRY 0.49 -0.81 -0.35 68.52 1.01   
PEIX 2.95 -2.92 -1.27 72.22 1.05   
PRH 0.55 -1.46 -0.63 75.93 1.16   
SURG 0.81 -1.02 -0.44 79.63 1.23   
TASR 3.94 8.19 3.56 83.33 2.07   
TKO 1.06 0.17 0.07 87.04 2.44   
VYHN -0.01 -0.28 -0.12 90.74 2.90   
WAVX 1.13 -2.10 -0.91 94.44 3.75   
NASDAQ -0.01 -0.05 -0.02  98.15 12.13    
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